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INTRODUCTION
In December 2013, holiday shoppers at Target became the
second-largest group of consumers in history to have their data
† Cornell Law School, Candidate for J.D., 2017. Thanks to Professor
Zachary Clopton, whose guidance produced this note; to Steve and Susan Anderson, whose guidance produced the author; and to Nate Smith, for edits and such.
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stolen in a cyber attack.1 Up to 110 million shoppers’ credit
and debit card numbers, phone numbers, and email addresses
comprised the stolen information. During the fallout, consumers and banks held Target alone responsible for the breach.2
Target settled with the consumers and created a fund of $10
million to compensate those whose data had been compromised.3 The banks’ class-action lawsuit against Target concluded when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
dismissed the appeal, thereby affirming the settlement.4
In November 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment was the
victim of a breach focused more on retribution than financial
gain. In response to the studio’s impending release of the
movie The Interview, hackers stole and published pirated versions of five films, scripts for upcoming projects, and employees’ personal data, including salaries and social security
numbers.5 They also installed malware that shut down employees’ computers for several days.6 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation identified the North Korean government as the
perpetrator of the attack.7 North Korea’s apparent motivation
was the content of The Interview, which depicted two Central
Intelligence Agency agents attempting to kill the North Korean
leader Kim Jong-Un.8 The government had previously de1
Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the Breach Numbers
Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2014, at B1. The largest group is the credit card users
of Heartland Payment Systems in 2009. Id.
2
In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 309 F.R.D. 482,
484–85 (D. Minn. 2015).
3
Target Agrees to Pay $10 Million to Settle Lawsuit from Data Breach,
REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/19/us-tar
get-settlement-idUSKBN0MF04K20150319 [https://perma.cc/LEX2-PKRS].
4
Judgment, In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 1508017 (8th Cir. June 23, 2016), ECF No. 15.
5
Brooks Barnes & Nicole Perlroth, Sony Pictures and F.B.I. Widen Hack
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at B3; Peter Elkind, Sony Pictures: Inside the
Hack of the Century, Part 1, FORTUNE (June 25, 2015), http://fortune.com/sonyhack-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/U57Z-4VTN].
6
Nicole Perlroth, Sony Pictures Computers Down for a Second Day After
Network Breach, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Nov. 25, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/11/25/sony-pictures-computers-down-for-a-second-day-after-networkbreach/ [https://perma.cc/VH7V-D5BP].
7
Nicole Perlroth, New Study May Add to Skepticism Among Security Experts
That North Korea Was Behind Sony Hack, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Dec. 24, 2014), http://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/new-study-adds-to-skepticism-among-se
curity-experts-that-north-korea-was-behind-sony-hack/ [https://perma.cc/
X87N-3TPF]. The cybersecurity community did not widely accept the FBI’s attribution, but the public statement of attribution by the U.S. government was notable in its own right.
8
Barnes & Perlroth, supra note 5, at B3.
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nounced the film and called its release an act of war.9 Following the attack, Sony itself made no attempt to respond or seek
compensation; instead, former employees sued Sony for failing
to protect their information10 and President Obama issued an
executive order imposing economic sanctions on the North Korean government.11
These two examples indicate a broader trend in cyber attacks: when consumers are the target, they sue the companies;
when companies are the target, they sue no one. Neither group
pursues recourse against the attackers themselves. There are
good reasons for this: identifying the perpetrators of cyber attacks is problematic and uncertain,12 the information on who
might be responsible often belongs to the government and is
classified,13 and the seeming likelihood of enforcing a judgment
against elusive hackers in a foreign country is nil. However,
these obstacles do not preclude a solution so much as they
require a creative one.
Liability for these incidents should fall on the most culpable party: the perpetrator of the attack. At least in the case of
government-sponsored cyber attacks—which account for a
large proportion of such attacks and are often some of the most
sophisticated14—the solution is a private right of action against
the foreign government.15 Despite the above-mentioned impediments, such a private right of action is feasible and would
remedy parties’ inability to recover damages from the party who
most directly caused their injury.
The United States Congress can provide this right—in fact,
it has done so before. In 1996, Congress legislated into existence a private right of action for victims of terrorist attacks
9
North Korea Complains to U.N. About Film Starring Rogen, Franco, REUTERS
(July 9, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/09/us-northkorea-unfilm-idUSKBN0FE21D20140709 [https://perma.cc/2C56-LSUK].
10
Ryan Faughnder, Sony Pictures Reaches Settlement in Hacking Lawsuit,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/
cotown/la-et-ct-sony-hack-studio-reaches-agreement-to-settle-with-plaintiffs20150902-story.html [https://perma.cc/2AUV-9U2L].
11
Exec. Order No. 13,687, 80 Fed. Reg. 819 (Jan. 2, 2015).
12
David E. Sanger & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking Linked to China Exposes
Millions of U.S. Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2015, at A1.
13
See id.
14
See Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for
Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L.
971, 974 (2011).
15
Pursuing a judgment against individuals, rather than a government, would
increase the likelihood of default judgments against absent defendants.
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sponsored by foreign governments.16 It did so in response to
several high-profile terrorist attacks with American victims.17
Congress created this right by amending the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) to provide an exception to foreign sovereign immunity where a state sponsor of terrorism had committed or sponsored a terrorist attack.18 Although other
exceptions to the FSIA already existed—namely, the tort exception and the commercial activity exception19—these offered insufficient recourse for the victims of terrorist attacks who could
not fit their claims neatly into either of those boxes.20 Terrorist
attacks required a specially tailored right of action to address
the particularities of such litigation.
This Note argues that Congress should create a similar
exception to the FSIA for cyber attacks sponsored by foreign
governments. Part I will address the current exceptions to the
FSIA and why they are an insufficient remedy for private parties victimized by state-sponsored cyber attacks. Part II will
use the terrorism exception as a model for creating a cyber
attack exception. Part III will address potential limitations of
such an exception and attempt to address several counterarguments to the proposal. The conclusion will briefly discuss why
a cyber attack exception is a better solution than the
alternatives.
I
THE INADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT FSIA EXCEPTIONS TO
ADDRESS CYBER ATTACKS
In addition to the terrorism exception to the FSIA, other
exceptions include: (1) waiver of immunity, (2) an exception for
tortious activity, (3) an exception for commercial activity, and
(4) an exception for expropriation of property.21 The lattermost
is inapplicable in the cyber context because electronic property
cannot, strictly speaking, be expropriated; it can be replicated
or deleted, but there is no way for a government to take it in the
16
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–172 (1996). Although there was dispute about the scope of this private right, Congress further
amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 2008 to make the scope unambiguous. See infra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
17
H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 37 (1995).
18
28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012).
19
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2012).
20
See infra subpart II.A.
21
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
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traditional sense.22 Assuming that foreign governments will
not waive their immunity in suits against them for committing
or sponsoring cyber attacks, then, the FSIA as is offers two
exceptions through which plaintiffs can bring such suits
against foreign governments. This Part will examine how each
of these exceptions has limited utility for victims of state-sponsored cyber attacks.
A. The Commercial Activity Exception
Perhaps the broadest exception to the FSIA is the commercial activity exception.23 It provides an exception to sovereign
immunity where the sovereign is acting within the market as a
private actor would.24 The exception requires that the claim be
“based upon” commercial activity and have some degree of connection to the United States.25
Victims of cyber attacks face a major potential problem in
proving that an attack is commercial activity at all. In Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, the Supreme Court held that whether
a foreign government was engaged in commercial activity
hinges on whether the government was acting as a “regulator of
[the] market” (which would be non-commercial activity) or as “a
private player within it”26 (which would be commercial activity).
The government’s act must have been of the nature that is “the
type of action[ ] by which a private party engages in ‘trade and
traffic or commerce.’”27 No court has ever considered whether
cyber attacks are that type of action.28
Whether a cyber attack would be considered commercial
depends on how the courts choose to define the relevant activity. If hacking, meaning merely gaining unauthorized access to
22
See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Weinstein v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, Civ. No. 14-7193, 2015 WL 9488371, at 9–13 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(arguing that domain names are not property under federal law). The scholarship
surrounding takings in the cyber context is scarce and deserves further development. Without statutory or precedential guidance extending takings doctrine to
purely electronic information, claimants are unlikely to succeed on a takings
theory.
23
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
24
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
25
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
26
504 U.S. at 614–15.
27
Id. at 614 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
28
The most analogous case, CYBERsitter, LLC v. People’s Republic of China,
involved whether distribution of plaintiff’s stolen computer code was commercial
activity for the purposes of FSIA. 805 F. Supp. 2d 958 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (applying
the commercial activity exception to FSIA where the Chinese government licensed
and distributed the software developed by the plaintiff). The plaintiff did not
allege that China had obtained the code through hacking. Id. at 968–69.
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a computer system, is the relevant activity, then any cyber
attack might qualify as commercial activity because private
actors are as capable of hacking as foreign governments are.
This would mean that every time a foreign government
deployed a cyber attack, it would be acting no differently than a
private player. If, however, the relevant activity is the function
that the cyber attack has in the physical world, then only certain attacks would qualify. For example, stealing the intellectual property of a rival player in the market (in the case of
commercial cyber espionage) could be commercial activity;
targeting a company’s computer systems because the company
had offended the hacker might not. The former might be construed as “within the market” whereas the latter most likely
would not.
Because hacking can serve so many different functions, it
seems unlikely that a court would make a blanket statement
that all hacking is commercial activity. Categorizing an attack
based on its function therefore seems more likely, which would
necessarily exclude the many victims of cyber attacks whose
victimization is not for commercial gain. Sony Pictures likely
could not recover if courts adopted such a definition, because
the attack it experienced was retaliatory.29
Even if courts were to decide that hacking is the relevant
activity, the fact that hacking is criminal under United States
federal law suggests that courts would hold that it is noncommercial.30 In a line of cases claiming that other crimes,
such as murder, kidnapping, and assassination fall under this
exception, the courts have held that none of these activities are
commercial.31 The only criminal activity which courts routinely find to be commercial under the FSIA is the formation of
illegal contracts.32 These findings are based on the fact that
contracts are typical means of private parties operating in the

29

See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.
Courts tend to look to domestic law of the foreign state for determining the
legality of the conduct in question. See Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d
869, 877 (9th Cir. 2000).
31
See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 167–68 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (kidnapping); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 797 (2d Cir. 1984)
(assassination); Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329, 331–32 (9th
Cir. 1984) (murder).
32
See Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 2002);
Adler, 219 F.3d at 875; Southway v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 198 F.3d 1210,
1217–18 (10th Cir. 1999).
30
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market,33 thereby meeting the private-player standard articulated in Weltover.34 Because hacking is not a routine function
for private parties operating in the market, it is likely that its
illegality would make it non-commercial for the purposes of the
FSIA.
If a court were to find that a cyber attack was, in fact,
commercial activity, the other two requirements—that the
claim must be “based upon” commercial activity and that that
activity must have a connection to the United States—would be
comparatively less problematic. The Supreme Court considered the “based upon” requirement in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson35
and concluded that for commercial activity to form the basis of
a claim, the commercial activity must satisfy those elements for
which the plaintiff has the burden of proof.36 Because cyber
attacks typically produce some injury, even if that is only invasion of privacy, the attack in question will usually give rise to
the victim’s injury and therefore form the basis of the victim’s
claim. Therefore, a cyber attack victim could probably show
that the claim is “based upon” the attack.
The degree of connection is also unlikely to be a problem
because the exception’s connection requirement is quite permissive. The exception requires only that commercial activity
abroad “cause[ ] a direct effect in the United States.”37 The
Supreme Court has construed “direct effect” broadly, as necessitating merely a non-trivial effect.38 The non-triviality requirement could exclude certain cyber attack suits where the attack
caused de minimis harm, but it would most likely include all
attacks leading to information being stolen or computer systems being impaired. As long as the claimant experienced
these non-trivial effects on a computer in the United States, the
claimant could likely show that the attack had caused the effects entailed by the connection requirement.39
Again, though, despite the likelihood that the “based upon”
requirement and the connection requirement could accommodate the claims of cyber attack victims, this depends on the
33
See, e.g., Adler, 219 F.3d at 875 (“The fact that the contract was for an
illegal purpose, and therefore was unenforceable, does nothing to destroy its
commercial nature.”).
34
See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
35
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
36
Id. at 357.
37
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
38
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992).
39
Cf. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 829 F.3d 197, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming
that data’s location is that of the server on which it is stored).
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open question of whether the attack is commercial activity at
all. That open question is unlikely to resolve in favor of this
group of potential plaintiffs. The commercial activity exception
intends to put foreign governments in the same position as
private parties in the market in which they compete, and thus
it does not offer a clear path to compensation for victims of
cyber attacks that are outside any market. Furthermore,
based on the courts’ previous construction of criminal activity
in the context of this exception, many victims would likely not
be able to recover under the exception. They must turn elsewhere for a remedy.
B. The Tort Exception
The FSIA also provides an exception for all torts that do not
fall within the commercial activity exception.40 Congress created this exception specifically to hold foreign governments liable for traffic accidents that their diplomats caused,41 but
included all torts involving personal injury, death, or “damage
to or loss of property.”42 The tort exception has two exceptions
of its own: it does not cover injury resulting from the performance of a “discretionary function,”43 and it does not cover “any
claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights.”44 Additionally, the tort must have occurred in
the United States.45 In order to fit a cyber attack into the tort
box, then, two challenges arise: the attack must have caused
“damage to or loss of property,” and it must have occurred
within the United States. Both of these requirements pose particular difficulty in the cyber context.
Regarding property damage, courts have struggled to answer the question of which electronic effects constitute damage. There are innumerable potential effects of a cyber attack,
and few of them give a clear answer: When malware shuts off a
computer, is that damage? When it slows the functioning of a
computer? When it uses the computer as part of a botnet?
When it copies documents from the hard drive and replicates
them on the hacker’s computer? What about merely recording
keystrokes? Each of these effects is common due to the
40
41
42
43
44
45

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 20–21 (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).
Id. § 1605(a)(5)(A).
Id. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
Id. § 1605(a)(5).
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proliferation of malware; each poses a definitional problem for
property damage.
There is little agreement on which of these examples might
qualify. Some courts do not recognize a cyber tort at all.46
Some courts hold that slowing or otherwise limiting the function of a computer constitutes damage. For example, in the
formative California case Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, the California
Supreme Court held that the use of Intel’s servers to send six
unsolicited emails to Intel’s 35,000 employees was insufficient;
because the emails had not limited the servers’ functioning, “as
by significantly reducing [their] available memory and processing power,” there had been no damage.47 Other courts require
a lesser showing—mere unauthorized use of a computer system qualifies as damage.48 This lack of consensus means that
victims of cyber attacks do not have any standard that might
predict whether they could recover under the tort exception.
Nor does the law seem to be moving in any particular direction;
instead, courts offer disjointed, contradictory rules that coalesce only in their discomfort adapting common-law tort doctrines to cyber incidents.49
Furthermore, these holdings do not directly address the
stealing of data, which is of fundamental concern for individuals with sensitive personal information and for companies with
valuable intellectual property. As discussed in the Introduction, companies must rely on the U.S. government to respond
to commercial cyberespionage against them.50 And although
the government handles retaliation for these attacks, that retaliation offers no recourse for their victims. Domestic tort law
does not give any guidance for how to litigate commercial espionage of intangible information as a tort.51 Certain exception46
See Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc., 469 F.3d 348, 359
(4th Cir. 2006) (“Oklahoma courts appear never to have recognized [a] tort based
upon intangible invasions of computer resources.”); Inventory Locator Serv., LLC
v. Partsbase, Inc., No. 02-2695, 2005 WL 2179185, at *11–12 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 6,
2005) (noting that Florida “does not recognize a cause of action for trespass to
chattels in cyberspace”).
47
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 306 (Cal. 2003).
48
See Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164,
2226–32 (2004) (discussing cases in which courts have “allowed system owners to
exclude unwanted uses when they have provided strong signals that the use is
unwanted”).
49
Takings law, which comprises the substantive law relevant to the FSIA’s
expropriation exception, is similarly ill-fitting for cyber attacks. See supra note 22
and accompanying text.
50
See supra text accompanying notes 11–13.
51
As a point of comparison, courts have held that the current statutory law
prohibiting commercial espionage does not cover espionage of intangible informa-
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ally sophisticated cyber attacks can cause physical damage to
the hardware that they infect; these attacks, however, are
among the rarest and most sophisticated.52 Most cyber attacks
involve information being stolen but no physical damage to the
infiltrated machine.53 And in these far more common cases,
plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on a tort claim despite cognizable commercial injury.
The requirement that the United States be the situs of the
tort creates a second major challenge for victims of cyber attacks bringing tort claims. The situs requirement could hypothetically apply to any or all of the following: the computer from
which the attacker launched the attack, the Internet cables
through which the malware traveled, the servers on which the
victim’s data was stored, the personal computer through which
the victim accessed that data, or where the effects of the attack
manifested.
Even outside the cyber context, there is no workable answer to the question of what conduct must be within the United
States. Federal courts tend to require both the tortious conduct and its resulting injury to have occurred domestically.54
Although a few circuits permit some relevant conduct to have
happened abroad, they do so only when the conduct within the
United States could, by itself, constitute a tort.55 In contrast,
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law says that only
the injury must occur domestically.56 Cyberspace exacerbates
this disagreement by offering many potential situses to consider. Adding even more unpredictability, some of the relevant
locations to a cyber attack—like where the malware traveled
between attacker and victim—may not be controlled by either
tion. Compare United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding
“that the theft and subsequent transmission of purely intangible property is beyond the scope of the NSPA”), with United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235,
235–44 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that when defendant removed computer code
which was in a tangible form consisting of thousands of sheets of paper . . . “he
was engaged in the theft or conversion of a ‘good’ in violation of NSPA”).
52
Shackelford & Andres, supra note 14, at 972.
53
See generally David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, 2
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 531, 536–42 (2011) (describing the most common classes of
cyber attacks, none of which involve physical damage to hardware).
54
Working Grp. of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Report, Reforming the Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 565–66 (2002).
55
Scott A. Gilmore, Suing the Surveillance States: The (Cyber) Tort Exception
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227, 254–55
(2015). Gilmore argues that the situs requirement (and the tort exception as a
whole) are a workable remedy in the cyber context; this argument seems to ignore
the divergent interpretations of the situs requirement.
56
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 454 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
1987).
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the attacker or the victim. As a result, the location of the injury
could potentially be one that neither the attacker nor the victim
anticipated.57 This too emphasizes how poorly cyber attacks fit
within the situs requirement.
As a final note, the discretionary function exception could
also pose a problem in certain cases depending on the defendant state. The discretionary function protects government officials who are exercising discretion to implement a state
policy.58 Where cyber attacks further such a state policy, a
government and its officials could avoid liability by claiming
that the attacks were merely the implementation of that policy.
This is not purely hypothetical: China has an official policy that
could be interpreted as encouraging commercial espionage.59
Although it is difficult to predict whether a court would interpret that policy the same way, or if other governments might
ever adopt a more explicit policy, it is conceivable that a country could take the diplomatic risk of adopting a pro-cyber attack policy constructed to evade liability under the
discretionary function exception.
Ultimately, however, the property damage and situs requirements create the greatest obstacles for claimants. Because neither the damage nor the location of cyber attacks
neatly parallels those requirements in the tort exception, this
exception is also an unsatisfactory option for victims of cyber
attacks. Their claims would have to meet unpredictable, illfitting standards, making success under this exception
unreliable.
II
USING THE TERRORISM EXCEPTION AS A MODEL FOR A
CYBER ATTACK EXCEPTION
A. The History and Text of the Terrorism Exception
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which included an amendment to
the FSIA.60 The AEDPA was a response to a litany of terrorist
attacks against U.S. citizens both domestically and abroad.61
57
Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 378–88
(2015).
58
Working Grp. of the Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 54, at 570.
59
Scott J. Shackelford et al., Using BITs to Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber
Peace by Safeguarding Trade Secrets Through Bilateral Investment Treaties, 52
AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 11 (2015).
60
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996)).
61
H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 37 (1995).
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These attacks, according to the legislative history, represented
a “serious and growing threat” that necessitated increased capability to hold the responsible parties liable.62
Congress intended the amendment to the FSIA to be an
“economic and financial weapon against . . . outlaw states.”63
Specifically, the amendment created a new exception to foreign
sovereign immunity for “suits alleging extrajudicial killing, torture, aircraft sabotage, or hostage-taking undertaken by, or on
behalf of, a foreign government.”64 The claimant—although not
necessarily the victim—must have been a United States national at the time of the attack.65 The foreign government must
have been designated by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism either before the attack or as a result of the
attack.66
In addition to amending the text of the FSIA to include this
exception, Congress passed a separate amendment five months
later which created a private right of action for victims of such
attacks.67 This amendment, known as the Flatow Amendment,
became an explanatory note printed after the list of exceptions
to the FSIA.68 Despite this apparent informality, the Flatow
Amendment had the same legal force as the text of the statute.69 Its scope, however, was construed narrowly so as to
exclude suits against foreign governments themselves and to
allow only suits against “officials, employees, [or] agents of a
foreign state.”70 As for compensation under this private right of
action, plaintiffs struggled to collect.71 Doing so required assistance from the executive branch in freeing blocked assets,
which the executive branch was free to withhold for national
security reasons and reluctant to give for political reasons.72
62

Id.
Id. at 62.
64
Id. at 41.
65
Id. at 62.
66
See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 16 (D.D.C. 1998).
67
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 589, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–172 (1996).
68
Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 12–13.
69
Id. at 13 (“The amendment should be considered to relate back to the
enactment of [the terrorism exception] as if they had been enacted as one
provision . . . .”).
70
Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1033 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
71
William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire with . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New
War on State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 105, 118–19
(2002).
72
See id. at 119.
63
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In 2008, fed up with judiciary’s narrow construction of the
Flatow Amendment and especially with the executive branch’s
barriers to collection,73 Congress converted the terrorism exception to its current form.74 Now in its own section separate
from the other exceptions, the terrorism exception contains a
private right of action, in the statutory text, against both foreign governments and their officials, employees, or agents.75 A
provision concerning attachment of property has removed the
barriers previously employed by the executive branch.76
As codified in the 2008 amendment, the terrorism exception is precisely tailored to the challenges of litigating suits
against state sponsors of terrorism. Unlike the tort or commercial activity exceptions, which concern broad categories of conduct and therefore must be constructed broadly, the terrorism
exception need only address particular and comparatively rare
suits. This permits a high degree of specificity to address potential interference by the judicial or executive branches.
First, the terrorism exception’s private right of action
stands in contrast to the other exceptions to the FSIA, which
provide only that the courts will have jurisdiction over claims
brought under them.77 This reflects the relative dearth of case
law concerning terrorism as compared to that concerning torts,
commercial relationships, or property rights. By expressly including a private right of action, Congress removed the possibility of judges finding an insufficient historical or statutory
basis for a suit based on a terrorist attack. Congress abrogated
the need for such a basis by specifying which four types of
actions it meant to proscribe: torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage-taking.78 Confining the scope of
the exception to these categories also shields it from judicial or
political disagreement over what qualifies as terrorism.
Furthermore, the exception imposes liability not just for
the commission of terrorist acts, but also for “the provision of
material support or resources for such an act.”79 In this way,
73

154 CONG. REC. H8,098–01 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2008) (statement of Sen.

Scott).
74
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338–44 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012)).
75
28 U.S.C. § 1605A.
76
28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012).
77
First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 620 (1983).
78
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(1).
79
Id. The definition of “material support or resources” is that originally established by the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, § 120005, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022–23 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2012)):
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Congress included a type of conduct—material support—which
is uniquely important for the terrorism exception. Unlike other
torts, where material support plays a less proximate role in the
injury, Congress determined that material support for terrorism is just as reprehensible, and just as necessary to deter, as
perpetration. Rather than leave this to judicial interpretation,
the exception clearly identifies it in its intended scope of
liability.
Other requirements also ensure that application of the
statute will hew closely to Congress’s desired remedy. The requirement that the defendant state be designated a state sponsor of terrorism80 narrows the list of possible defendant states.
By limiting suits in this way, Congress avoids numerous pitfalls. First, the executive branch designates which governments may be liable under the exception, which keeps ultimate
control over foreign affairs within the executive branch. Second, the governments that have been designated as state sponsors of terrorism are on notice that they may be liable to
individuals under this exception, which bolsters the justification for creating another exception to the general principle of
foreign sovereign immunity. Third, the designation requirement is temporally flexible: the foreign government may have
been designated a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the
attack or as a result of the attack. This ensures that the law
may be responsive to changing geopolitical conditions.
Moreover, Congress gave the executive branch another limitation on suits under the terrorism exception: the ability to
stay discovery to preserve an ongoing investigation or operation
“related to the incident that gave rise to the cause of action.”81
This ensures that individual plaintiffs will not compromise the
government’s ability to respond to terrorist attacks how it sees
fit. However, after ten years, the stay can be renewed only if the

80
81

(1) the term “material support or resources” means any property,
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals
who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine
or religious materials;
(2) the term “training” means instruction or teaching designed to
impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge; and
(3) the term “expert advice or assistance” means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A).
28 U.S.C. § 1605(g)(1)(A) (2012).
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Attorney General can show it is necessary.82 By placing the
burden of proof on the government after that length of time,
Congress has limited the likelihood that the executive branch
will unreasonably use secrecy as an excuse for denying recovery to individual plaintiffs.
Finally, the exception contains numerous provisions to address the difficulty plaintiffs have in collecting on their judgments.83 One automatically establishes a lien on any property
of the defendant state within the court’s jurisdiction.84 This
circumvents executive control over which plaintiffs may recover
which assets. A second provision makes all property of a defendant state subject to attachment following a judgment
against the state.85 It emphasizes that the property will be
attachable regardless of the extent to which the defendant state
exerts control over it or profits from it. By removing discretionary reasons to deny attaching certain property, Congress increased the effectiveness of the remedy it intended to establish.
These provisions strike a careful balance of executive and
judicial control. While respecting the foreign affairs powers of
the executive branch, the exception removes executive discretion that could limit plaintiffs’ recovery on a case-by-case basis.
Crafting numerous carefully-tailored rules to allocate discretion between the branches, Congress designed a private right of
action that maximizes its potential to reach its stated goals.
B. Modeling a Cyber Attack Exception
Current conditions are ripe for a cyber attack exception.
Much like the seeming increase of terrorist attacks against
Americans, which prompted the terrorism exception, cyber attacks against U.S. citizens and companies are on the rise.86
Unlike the terrorist attacks of the 1980s and 90s, however, the
number of cyber attacks is underpublicized;87 many companies do not go public after being attacked lest it harm their
business interests.88 This indicates that, if anything, cyber
attacks are more of a problem than the public knows about.
82

Id. § 1605(g)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(g); 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012).
84
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(g).
85
28 U.S.C. § 1610(g).
86
Shackelford & Andres, supra note 14, at 974.
87
See Alan W. Ezekiel, Note, Hackers, Spies, and Stolen Secrets: Protecting
Law Firms from Data Theft, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 649, 653 (2013).
88
See id.
83
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Given that feelings of cyber-insecurity are already high,89 there
is ample evidence that the time has come for an effective remedy to a persistent problem. What follows is a suggested framework based on the structure and content of the terrorism
exception.
(a) No immunity.—A foreign state shall not be immune from
the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States
in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for unprivileged access to or use of proprietary electronically-stored
information, impairment of the function of a computer system, damage to computer hardware, or the provision of material support or resources for such acts if such act or provision
of material support or resources is engaged in by an official,
employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within
the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency and
such acts cause substantial effects in the United States.
(b) Claim heard.—The court shall hear a claim under this
section if
(a) the claimant was, at the time the act described in
paragraph (a) occurred—
(A) a national of the United States;
(B) a member of the armed forces; or
(C) otherwise an employee of the Government of the
United States, or of an individual performing a contract
awarded by the United States Government, acting
within the scope of the employee’s employment; and
(2) the claimant files suit not more than 5 years after the
claimant became aware of the conduct that gave rise to
the cause of action
(c) Private right of action.—A foreign state and any official,
employee, or agent of that foreign state while acting within
the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, shall be
liable to:
(1) a national of the United States,
(2) a member of the armed forces,
(3) an employee of the Government of the United States,
or of an individual performing a contract awarded by the
United States Government, acting within the scope of the
employee’s employment, or
(4) the legal representative of a person described in subparagraph (1), (2), or (3) of this paragraph, for damage
89
Shackelford & Andres, supra note 14, at 974 (“President Obama has stated
that $1 trillion was lost to cybercrime in 2009 . . . . This revelation prompted
Rhode Island Democrat Sheldon Whitehouse to argue, ‘I believe we are suffering
what is probably the biggest transfer of wealth through theft and piracy in the
history of mankind.’”).
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caused by acts described in paragraph (a) of that foreign
state, or of an official, employee, or agent of that foreign
state, for which the courts of the United States may
maintain jurisdiction under this section for money
damages.

Several components of this proposed exception deserve explanation. First, and most importantly, the exception creates a
private right of action for cyber attacks. This prevents claimants from having to rely on common-law precedent or ill-fitting
statutes to assert their right to a remedy. Second, the statute
of limitations for such claims would be five years. This is significantly less than the terrorism exception’s statute of limitations because cyber attacks will generally cause less grave
harm than terrorist attacks. Notably, however, the statute of
limitations is five years after the claimant detects the attack,
not after the attack itself. This acknowledges the prevalence of
sophisticated cyber attacks capable of causing harm without
immediate detection.90
The proscribed conduct is modeled after the terrorism exception in that it identifies categories that are broad enough to
include most kinds of cyber attacks.91 Material support, which
could use the same definition incorporated into the terrorism
exception,92 is included to account for the possibility of states
using individuals who are not government employees to carry
out cyber attacks.93 Finally, the exception requires that the
cyber attack produced “substantial effects” in the United
States, which would avoid the need to rely on a theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute a cyber attack that was conducted in the state sponsor’s territory.94
III
ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THIS MODEL
A. Attribution
Attribution is notoriously difficult for cyber attacks, in part
because it is so easy for hackers to falsify the source of the
90

See Ezekiel, supra note 87, at 652.
Clark & Landau, supra note 53, at 536–42 (listing distributed denial of
service attacks, spam, identity theft, and data exfiltration as the primary classes
of attacks).
92
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.
93
Shackelford & Andres, supra note 14, at 975.
94
For an explanation of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the difficulty facing
claims that rely on it, see William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 (1998).
91
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attacks.95 Even high-profile attacks frequently go unattributed.96 The U.S. government rarely takes the step of publicly attributing an attack to a foreign government, even when
there is wide suspicion of a particular actor.97 When the U.S.
government does identify an attacker, as with the Sony attack,
neither experts nor the media take this to be conclusive;98 nor
should they, given the classified and possibly politically-motivated nature of such attributions. Given how difficult it is for
victims to identify their attackers, let alone to agree on whether
that identification is correct, why create a private right of action
that depends on attribution to provide any remedy at all?
The answer is that civil litigation is a better context than
most to confront the problematic factual question of attribution. In the media, any author can attribute an attack to a
foreign government with a minimal level of certainty, constrained only by the journalistic ethics of his or her publication. For the U.S. government, publicly announcing that a
foreign government was behind a cyber attack represents a
foreign relations decision with major consequences and therefore should only be done with a high degree of certainty.99 Civil
litigation falls in between these two extremes.
In fact, civil litigation offers a modest but radical solution
to the problem of attribution: claimants need only prove the
identity of their attackers by a preponderance of the evidence.
This departs markedly from the current process of attribution
for cyber attacks, which requires a substantially higher degree
of certainty. Moreover, civil litigation routinely relies on expert
witnesses to assist laypeople in making complex or highly technical factual determinations. Already there are expert witnesses who testify about cybersecurity and cyber
investigations.100 Similarly, there are experts (not yet widely
employed as witnesses) who act as consultants following cyber
attacks.101 Cybersecurity firms have powerful attribution capabilities that they could use as a basis for expert testimony in
95

See, e.g., Clark & Landau, supra note 53, at 537.
For example, the party or parties responsible for the Target data breach
have never been publicly identified.
97
See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
98
See, e.g., Perlroth, supra note 7.
99
See infra subpart III.B for further discussion of foreign relations
challenges.
100
See, e.g., Music Grp. Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. Foote, No. 14-cv03078-JSC, 2015 WL 3882448, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2015); United States v.
Welton, No. CR 09-00153, 2009 WL 4507744, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2009).
101
See, e.g., Brooks Barnes & Nicole Perlroth, Sony Films Are Pirated, and
Hackers Leak Studio Salaries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2014, at B1 (noting that Sony
96
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court.102 Based on such testimony for either side, the
factfinder could evaluate whether the attribution was, more
likely than not, correct. In this way, claimants could overcome
the difficulties of attribution by using resources (cybersecurity
firms) and procedures (expert testimony) already in place.
A valid and serious objection to this system would be that
the risk of mistaken attribution is too high. While suits
brought under the terrorism exception also depend on the reliability of civil litigation, the consequences of error are constrained by the requirement that the defendant state be
designated by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism.103 That way, if the civil suit renders a verdict based on
an incorrect finding of fact, then the cost of that mistake will
fall on a state whom the United States has little interest in
appeasing anyway.
As discussed below, however, constructing an executivebranch limitation on a cyber attack exception might ultimately
be undesirable. Alternatively, one way to limit fallout from mistaken attribution would be to include a provision in the exception that limited the res judicata effect of any attribution for a
particular cyber attack: findings of attribution would not be
binding on the same parties or other parties in future suits.
Doing so would parallel the protection that the Supreme Court
has afforded to the United States against nonnmutual offensive
collateral estoppel.104 By allowing a defendant state to re-litigate the issue in subsequent suits, each factfinder could make
its own determination about attribution, thereby increasing the
likelihood of eventually correcting the mistake. This would not
prevent the embarrassment caused by the first erroneous attribution; however, the risk of that embarrassment might have
other benefits. For example, it might incentivize countries to
pursue domestic prosecution of hackers whose malware shares
identifying features with, and therefore might be mistakenly
attributed to, that country’s government.

Pictures hired consultants from FireEye, an “online security firm[ ],” to help respond to the cyber attack).
102
The website of the cybersecurity firm employed by Sony Pictures offers
“Litigation Support” and notes that it provides expert testimony. MANDIANT CONSULTING, https://www.fireeye.com/services/mandiant-litigation-support.html
[https://perma.cc/WU2P-5MY9].
103
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
104
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1984).
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B. Foreign Relations
As mentioned above, the cyber attack exception I have suggested omits a major foreign-relations safeguard that is in the
terrorism exception: the state sponsor of terrorism designation.
This omission arguably carries the risk of upsetting the balance of foreign-relations power. By giving the executive branch
the exclusive power to enumerate the possible defendants to
terrorism-exception suits, the executive branch and not the
claimant has ultimate control over the potential for diplomatic
embarrassment caused by such a suit. The history of suits
under the terrorism exception indicates that the executive
branch often prefers to minimize claimants’ ability to use the
exception at all; critics’ chief complaint about these suits has
been executive-branch refusal to un-block assets that could
compensate victims.105 Because state sponsors of terrorism
have few assets within the United States that are not blocked
by the executive branch, this refusal acts as a near-complete
bar to plaintiffs’ recovery.106 Arguably, the executive branch
would strongly oppose a cyber attack exception given its obvious discomfort with the terrorism exception.
That executive-branch attitude may not extend to the cyber
attack context, however. The public stance of the executive
branch on terrorist attacks and state sponsors of terrorism is
resounding, unwavering condemnation. For cyber attacks
sponsored by foreign governments, on the other hand, the executive branch has been hesitant to confront the governments
responsible; critics say unjustifiably so.107 For example, following the revelation that Chinese hackers had stolen data on
21.5 million citizens from the United States Office of Personnel
Management in two separate cyber attacks,108 the executive
branch never publicly confirmed the attacks’ national origin.
Although widely acknowledged in the media as a Chinese operation,109 the government itself made no such attribution. This
105
Ilana Arnowitz Drescher, Seeking Justice for America’s Forgotten Victims:
Reforming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Terrorism Exception, 15 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 791, 813–15 (2012).
106
Id. at 814.
107
See David E. Sanger, Countering Cyberattacks Without a Playbook, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2014, at A3; Jack Goldsmith, More Harmful Public Hand-Wringing
on Possible Sanctions Against China for Cyber Theft, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 31, 2015,
5:45 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-harmful-public-hand-wringingpossible-sanctions-against-china-cyber-theft [https://perma.cc/7S4H-HTYP].
108
Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5
Million People, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2015, at A1.
109
See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt et al., Chinese Hackers Pursue Key Data on
U.S. Workers, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, at A1; Kevin Liptak et al., China Might Be
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suggests that even after the most egregious cyber attacks, the
executive branch is not eager to assign blame.
One possible reason for that reluctance is that the diplomatic cost of attribution could be very high, and the nearimpossibility of attributing an attack with complete certainty
makes it even higher. Therefore, while controlling judgments
under the terrorism exception offers the U.S. government the
chance to quietly soften its stance against the defendant state,
judgments under a cyber attack exception would offer the
chance to quietly toughen its stance. Doing so might offset the
government’s inability to take a hard line publicly due to the
difficulties of attribution. Were the cyber attack exception to
include a designation requirement like that in the terrorism
exception, the U.S. government would have to play a role in
attribution that it does not seem to want.
The contrary view on a cyber attack exception would be
that because it implicates foreign affairs more directly than the
traditional, pre-terrorism exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity, the response to cyber attacks should remain under the
exclusive control of the executive branch. The executive
branch coordinates all of the government’s diplomatic efforts,
and because cybersecurity agreements are now part of those
efforts,110 giving private parties this mechanism would decrease the coherence and effectiveness of the United States’
cybersecurity negotiations. Moreover, if the executive branch
decides to take a harder line against state-sponsored cyber
attacks in the future, it should be able to set the terms for
doing so rather than relying on private actors.
The answer to this objection lies in the scope of the cyber
attack exception, which importantly excludes attacks by governments against other governments.111 This means that espionage against government information—military secrets,
intelligence capabilities, and internal decision-making
processes—may remain free from liability even when conducted in cyberspace. No doubt the United States government
conducts precisely these kinds of cyber attacks and would not
want to set a precedent of pursuing domestic prosecution for
these actions. All that a cyber attack exception would do, then,
Building Vast Database of Federal Worker Info, Experts Say, CNN (June 6, 2015,
9:38 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/04/politics/federal-agency-hackedpersonnel-management/ [https://perma.cc/NQ2F-9WHB].
110
Jack Goldsmith, What Explains the U.S.-China Cyber “Agreement?”,
LAWFARE BLOG (Sept. 26, 2015, 9:20 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whatexplains-us-china-cyber-agreement [https://perma.cc/L28C-8277].
111
As does the U.S.-China cyber agreement. Id.
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is exclude private parties as legitimate targets for foreign
governments.
Notably, the United States would likely be bound by this
exclusion as well, since other countries might well be inspired
to pass similar legislation imposing liability on the United
States for its cyber attacks against private parties. But this is
hardly a drawback. Citizens of other countries deserve protection equally as much as United States citizens. Were every
country to pass such a law, it would merely and properly confine government-sponsored attacks to non-civilian targets.
IV
COMPARISON TO ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Alternative Solutions Pursued by the United States
Government
1. U.S. Department of Justice’s Indictment of Five
Chinese Hackers
One alternative to the proposed legislation is prosecution of
the perpetrators of cyber attacks. For instance, in May 2014,
the United States Department of Justice announced the indictment of five members of the Chinese military for their alleged
hacking of six U.S. companies in the nuclear, solar power, and
steel industries.112 Notably, this indictment suggested that the
Department of Justice had reached the conclusion that the
FSIA did not protect these military employees. This came in
spite of the fact that the indictment focused on activities that,
as discussed above, are problematic under the FSIA’s current
exceptions: unauthorized access to computers, the transfer of
malware, commercial espionage, and trade secret theft.
In doing so, the Department of Justice distinguished between hacking for economic gain and hacking for national security purposes.113 This distinction is not one recognized by
112
U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against
U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage, OFFICE OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-uscorporations-and-labor [https://perma.cc/X2CZ-J7WW]. The hackers were identified as Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu, and Gu Chunhui
of Unit 61398 in the Third Department of the People’s Liberation Army. Id. The
targeted companies were identified as Westinghouse Electric Company, U.S. subsidiaries of SolarWorld AG, United States Steel Corporation, Allegheny Technologies, Inc., the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy,
Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, and Alcoa Inc.
113
David E. Sanger, With Spy Charges, U.S. Draws a Line That Few Others
Recognize, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/
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the Chinese government. The indictment and the surrounding
rhetoric met with skepticism from commentators who pointed
out that the United States confounds its own distinction when
it spies on private foreign companies to gather information relevant to trade deals.114
The indictment used domestic liability to deter foreign actors from perpetrating cyber attacks against U.S. private parties, much like an exception to the FSIA would. Rather than
rely on international consensus, it was a unilateral declaration
of disapproval by the United States. Moreover, it seems to have
worked as a deterrent. Although the indicted individuals are
unlikely to ever face prosecution,115 the Washington Post reported in November 2015 that the number of cyber attacks by
the Chinese military against U.S. companies had dropped significantly since the indictment was announced.116 The indictment’s success illustrates that, should the United States
government have the political will to pursue prosecution of
those responsible for state-sponsored cyber attacks, that
threat of prosecution can cause gradual but effective deterrence of further attacks.
2. U.S.-China Bilateral Cybersecurity Agreement
A second alternative to domestic legislation would be bilateral agreements prohibiting cyber attacks against the signatory
countries. The United States has already signed such an
agreement with China, which has prompted considerable media coverage and skepticism.117 Announced in September
us/us-treads-fine-line-in-fighting-chinese-espionage.html [https://perma.cc/
3KWC-J9WL].
114
Jack Goldsmith, Why Did DOJ Indict the Chinese Military Officers?,
LAWFARE BLOG (May 20, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-did-doj-indictchinese-military-officers [https://perma.cc/A566-WNNW] (“[S]ome elements of
the indictment concern cyber-snooping in connection with trade disputes, which
at least sounds a lot like the kind of cyber-snooping on firms that the United
States does.”); Sanger, supra note 107 (“[T]he United States spies regularly for
economic advantage when the goal is to support trade talks . . . .”).
115
Paul Rosenzweig, More Thoughts on the DOJ China Indictment, LAWFARE
BLOG (May 20, 2014, 9:40 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-thoughtsdoj-china-indictment [https://perma.cc/3AL2-3EPD].
116
Ellen Nakashima, Following U.S. Indictments, China Shifts Commercial
Hacking Away from Military to Civilian Agency, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/following-us-indict
ments-chinese-military-scaled-back-hacks-on-american-industry/2015/11/30/
fcdb097a-9450-11e5-b5e4-279b4501e8a6_story.html [https://perma.cc/4FW78RAF].
117
See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Don’t Get Too Excited About a US-China Arms
Control Agreement for Cyber, LAWFARE BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015, 8:25 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/dont-get-too-excited-about-us-china-arms-control-agree
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2015, the agreement is the first-ever cyber “arms deal.”118 The
agreement addressed the practice of state-sponsored cyber attacks against private parties;119 both countries agreed to “mitigate malicious cyber activity emanating from their territory”
and to forgo “conduct[ing] or knowingly support[ing] cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or
other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”120 Although the phrase “conduct or knowingly support”
is not defined in the agreement, the agreement indicates that
China acquiesced to American pressure to desist its sponsorship of commercial espionage.121
Despite the obvious step forward that such an agreement
represented in cyber-relations between the two countries, the
content of the agreement—and what it lacks—may limit its
effectiveness. Notably, the agreement does not prohibit cyber
espionage conducted for a national security purpose rather
than an economic purpose.122 This could leave certain U.S.
private parties with security-related information vulnerable to
attacks by the Chinese government.123 More broadly, the types
of attack prohibited by the agreement are not those most commonly conducted by China against U.S. targets. As David
Sanger of the New York Times noted about the negotiations,
While [the] agreement could address attacks on power stations, banking systems, cellphone networks and hospitals, it
ment-cyber [https://perma.cc/R53F-W3WY] (doubting the ability of the agreement to constrain Chinese hacking).
118
David E. Sanger, U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/world/asia/us-andchina-seek-arms-deal-for-cyberspace.html [https://perma.cc/B4BK-JPX9].
119
Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States, WHITE
HOUSE OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-statevisit-united-states [https://perma.cc/Q9TR-FBJ4].
120
Id.
121
Jack Goldsmith, Correction/Update: China Did Accept the American Formulation in the Cyber Deal, LAWFARE BLOG (Sept. 27, 2015), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/correctionupdate-china-did-accept-american-formulation-cyber-deal
[https://perma.cc/QR6U-YBJ8].
122
See Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States, supra
note 119.
123
See Matthew Dahl, What Effect Could Chinese Military Reorganization Have
on the Recent US-China Cyber Agreement?, LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 3, 2015, 5:55 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-effect-could-chinese-military-reorganization
-have-recent-us-china-cyber-agreement [https://perma.cc/HF9E-B32X] (“This
leaves the door open for cyber espionage against private companies, for example,
in the defense sector which China could claim is related to national security, but
which the US sees as seeking a competitive commercial advantage.”).
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would not, at least in its first version, protect against most of
the attacks that China has been accused of conducting in the
United States, including the widespread poaching of intellectual property and the theft of millions of government employees’ personal data.124

Besides the narrow scope of its agreement, the nature of cyber
attacks means that the difficulty of attributing cyber attacks to
the Chinese government could prevent the United States from
effectively enforcing the agreement.125
The drawbacks of the agreement have not kept it from
catching on: both the UK and Germany signed similar agreements with China within weeks of the United States’ agreement.126 These agreements between several of the world’s
most powerful countries suggest that a proliferation of such
bilateral agreements could substitute for a multilateral convention and allow the prohibition on state-sponsored cyber attacks
to develop gradually as it becomes politically palatable.
3. The Problems with These Domestic, GovernmentControlled Solutions
These solutions, however, share two fundamental
problems. First, the pursuit of recourse depends not on the
victims’ motivation but on the government’s. As the U.S. government has already indicated in its response to other major
cyber attacks, governments are not always motivated to hold
the culpable party responsible.127 The second problem is that
the victims are not compensated for their losses. The indictments, being based in criminal law, may lead to fines, but
those payments would go to the U.S. government rather than to
the victims.128 Bilateral cybersecurity agreements, at least in
their current form, contain no provisions whatsoever about
compensation. Moreover, the agreements are merely statements of the signatories’ intention not to conduct cyber attacks
against the other; they contain no means for enforcement.129
124

Sanger, supra note 118.
See Goldsmith, supra note 117.
126
Rowena Mason, Xi Jinping State Visit: UK and China Sign Cybersecurity
Pact, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2015, 12:13 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2015/oct/21/uk-china-cybersecurity-pact-xi-jinping-david-cameron [https://
perma.cc/EL9R-GN23]; Stefan Nicola, China Working to Halt Commercial
Cyberwar in Deal with Germany, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2015, 8:31 AM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-29/china-working-to-halt-commercial-cyberwar-in-deal-with-germany [https://perma.cc/D6LU-S3YT].
127
See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
128
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
129
Goldsmith, supra note 117.
125
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Hypothetically, future cybersecurity agreements could contain
stronger enforcement provisions, or at least waive the signatories’ sovereign immunity for cyber attacks in the other signatories’ domestic courts. The extant agreements, however—which
are presumably the strongest agreements that are diplomatically achievable at present—contain no such protections beyond the good intentions of the signatories.
B. Alternative Solutions Pursued by Other Parties
In addition to the United States government’s current efforts to deter state-sponsored cyber attacks, other alternatives
exist that could come from different sources. First, the private
sector could strengthen its nascent cybersecurity insurance
industry. Currently, insurance companies offer coverage to
companies, although not to individuals, for losses from data
breaches or hacking.130 This market could expand its protection to individuals and thereby provide compensation to nearly
all of the potential victims of state-sponsored cyber attacks.
Although this solution might not deter such attacks, since it
would place the financial burden on the consumers and providers in the insurance industry rather than on the state sponsors
of the attacks, it would at least provide compensation to the
victims. Even so, companies or individuals will have had to
purchase insurance ahead of time or indemnity would be
unavailable.
On the other hand, the solution could come from the international community. For example, a multilateral convention,
containing similar declarations to those contained in the bilateral agreements with China, could establish an international
prohibition on state-sponsored cyber attacks. Although international consensus on the issue seems far-fetched at the moment, the international community has agreed before on a
multilateral convention concerning cyber attacks: in 2001, the
Council of Europe created the Convention on Cybercrime, also
known as the Budapest Convention.131 The goal of the convention was to promote “a common criminal policy aimed at the
protection of society against cybercrime,” and it entered into
force in 2004.132 The crimes contemplated by the convention
130
Report on Cyber Security in the Insurance Sector, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN.
SERVS. (Feb. 2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/dfs_cyber_insurance_re
port_022015.pdf [https://perma.cc/S75L-242U].
131
Details of Treaty No. 185, TREATY OFFICE, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 [https://
perma.cc/T543-DA5Y].
132
Id.
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include computer fraud, breaches of network security, copyright infringement, and child pornography.133 As of 2016, the
convention has fifty-four signatories, forty-seven of whom have
ratified it.134 Although the aim of this treaty was merely encouraging domestic legislation on the subject, it could serve as
an example for a more aggressive convention that took the step
of actually prohibiting state-sponsored cyber attacks.
An international prohibition could also serve as the basis
for litigation in international tribunals. Hypothetically, if there
were an international norm against cyber attacks or if there
were a treaty conferring jurisdiction on an international tribunal, then states could bring suits against the state sponsors of
cyber attacks on behalf of their citizens who were victims. Although there is little movement toward such a norm, let alone
one that would provide a right of action in an international
tribunal, the development of such a norm would provide an
alternative means of prosecuting the state sponsors of cyber
attacks.
CONCLUSION
A cyber attack exception to the FSIA has the potential to be
a powerful deterrent and compensatory tool. Given sufficient
tailoring to the peculiarities of attributing and litigating cyber
attacks, such an exception could provide a far more certain
and effective remedy than any currently available under the
FSIA. Despite valid concerns about the uncertainty of attribution and the delicate balance of foreign-affairs power, a cyber
attack exception would be workable and politically palatable. It
would also help compensate the victims of cyber attacks who
have little recourse against the foreign governments responsible for their losses. Using the terrorism exception as a model,
Congress should create a private right of action to serve as a
more reliable and just remedy than any of those currently
available.

133
Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2011, ETS No. 185, http://www.euro
parl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/7_conv_budapest_/
7_conv_budapest_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYF4-TW8W].
134
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185, TREATY OFF., COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
treaty/185/signatures [https://perma.cc/YP2G-7NC4].
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